ABSTRACT
This study applies the New Regionalism Theory developed by Bjorn Hettne and others to analyse regionalism in South and Southeast Asia. On the basis of Hettne’s framework, it argues that Southeast Asia has reached the third level of regionalism. It exists, at present, as an intermediate region. On the other hand, South Asia has not gone past the second level of regionalism; it is indeed a peripheral region.

The paper first explains the process of formation of SAARC, its structure, and organisation. It makes a critical survey of the functioning of SAARC network of organisations. Keeping in mind SAARC’s failure to contribute to both regional security and development, the study shows that South Asia has not gone past the second stage of regionalism in Hettne’s scheme. In the latter part, it makes a critical survey of the ASEAN regional organisation and the network of various other regional organisations. In assessing the way ASEAN has adapted to post-Cold War IR and its contributions to both regional security and development, the study confirms that Southeast Asia has gone well past the third stage of regionalism in Hettne’s scheme.

INTRODUCTION
Regionalism has been a significant phenomenon in post-Second World War international relations. 1950s and 1960s witnessed the rise of many regional groups in different parts of the world – the European Economic Community in Western Europe, the Organisation of African Unity in Africa, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries in the Middle-East, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Southeast Asia, to name a few. The success of the EEC among these was the most spectacular, but the same was not repeated in other parts of the world. By 1980, many of these regional organisations had been weakened and some had even ceased to exist. However, regionalism received a renewed impetus after the end of the Cold War and with the push of globalisation. The end of the Cold War brought about some major transformations in the international order. It accelerated the growth of interdependence, and provided impetus to the process of globalization. This has led to the erosion of sovereign power of the state. The question whether the state is – and how long will it continue to be – the primary organizing unit of international system, is being debated much more seriously today than ever before. Since the mid and late 1980’s, regionalization began to re-appear in different parts of the world. This process coincided with the rise of globalization. The two processes, thus, need to be explained and analyzed in the context of each other. Both globalization and regionalization lead to integration; but the two operate at different levels and do not necessarily complement nor contradict each other.

The process of regionalization began in Southeast Asia since the 1960s. This led to the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Regionalization in Southeast Asia has sustained the challenge of the financial crisis of 1997. In South Asia, the process of regionalization began
with the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) in 1985. The process has not really picked up in South Asia due to several reasons. Even after the formation of the regional organization, the states in the region expected that regional co-operation would complement and not substitute other forms of bilateral or multilateral co-operation.

My research is about a comparative study of regionalism and regionalization in the two significant regions of Asia, viz. South and Southeast Asia. The findings of the study are presented in this paper.

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

“Regions” can be defined as primarily geographical entities, emerging as more or less integrated units on the basis of shared interests or identities. “Regionalism” is a political process that leads to enhanced integration in a geographical region. This study applies the New Regionalism Theory developed by Bjorn Hettne and others to analyse regionalism in South Asia. Hettne uses the term “regionness” to indicate the different levels of integration in a geographical unit. According to him, there are five levels of regionness which are explained as follows. 1. A region as a geographical unit or regional space. Regions are rooted in territorial space and are composed of communities controlling certain natural resources and united through a certain set of historical or cultural values. 2. Region as a social system or regional complex. Regional identities may date back to pre-modern history. A long history of interdependence may exist and this can be regarded as the starting point of regionalism. 3. A region as transnational co-operation or regional society. At this stage, a multitude of communication processes transcending the national space begin to emerge. These may be intergovernmental as well as non-state actors. A regional organisation may be formed giving formal shape to co-operation. Thus, the process of regionalisation gets more intensified. 4. A region as civil society or regional community. At this level, the region turns into an active subject with a distinct identity, legitimacy and decision-making structure vis-a-vis a civil society transcending the old state borders. The dividing line between separate and “imagined” national communities within the region may begin to gradually disappear as further development. 5. A region as acting subject or region state. This may give rise to an entity that would be larger than the states in territorial terms but by no means having the same degree of homogeneity or sovereignty of a nation-state.

The evolution from the first to the fifth stage of regionness is the consequence of the process of regionalisation, which Hettne defines as “the process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject, capable of articulating the trans-national interests of the emerging region.” Hettne emphasises that a region may not necessarily evolve from an earlier to a latter stage. It is possible that the process of regionalisation may fail, leading to decreasing regionness or even dissolution of a region. Regionalism has implications for both security and development in a region. In the first case, it aims at transforming “a security complex with conflict generating interstate and intrastate relations” into “a security community with co-operative external relations and domestic peace.” In the second case, it refers to “concerted efforts from a group of countries within a geographical region to increase the complementarity and capacity of the total regional economy as well as finding the right balance between functions and territory.”

Based on the five levels of regionness and the success of security and development regionalism, the different regions can be classified into three categories, namely, core regions, intermediate regions and peripheral regions. Core regions have some or all of the following features: they are politically strong, more organised at the supra-state level, economically dynamic and growing in a sustained manner. Intermediate regions are closely linked with some or the other core region. They tend to imitate the political and economic systems of this core region and at some future stage might be absorbed into the
core region. Peripheral regions are politically turbulent or economically stagnant or both. They face wars, domestic crises as well as underdevelopment.

I seek to argue, on the basis of the above framework, that Southeast Asia has reached the third level of regionness and that it is an intermediate region; and that South Asia has not gone past the second level of regionalism and that it is indeed a peripheral region.

**REGIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA**

*Before SAARC*

The modern region of South Asia comprises of what is traditionally known as the Indian subcontinent. This roughly includes the territory between China in the north and the Indian Ocean in the south; and between Afghanistan in the west and Myanmar in the east. Most of the boundaries of this subcontinent are delimited by natural and geographical features Indian subcontinent or South Asia has existed as regional space since pre-modern history. Since ancient times until the British period, the small principalities and big empires of the region have had a history of interdependence. This interdependence extended from trade and commerce to migration of peoples and from conquerors of territory to intermarriages among ruling dynasties. Thus, it had developed as a regional complex even before the colonial period. The current political map of South Asia began to evolve since the early twentieth century. Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Burma (now Myanmar) were separated from the British Indian administration in 1935 and 1937 respectively. At the midnight of 14-15 August 1947, British India was partitioned to create two separate independent states, viz., India and Pakistan. Ceylon became independent from the British rule in 1948. The two land-locked kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan, though never ruled directly by the British, were under British suzerainty. With the withdrawal of the British, they became sovereign. Later in 1971, Pakistan was further divided when the geographically disconnected, Bengali-speaking eastern wing of Pakistan seceded, following a war, to form the independent state of Bangladesh.

South Asia receded into insular post-colonial state-system in the 1950s. The new states were zealously protective of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the “independence” to make foreign policies. The states in the region were unable to evolve regional approach to regional or global international issues. This was due to many factors. First, South Asian countries did not have a common perception of, or a common approach to, the Cold War and the superpower rivalry. Secondly, there was an absence of commonly perceived extra-regional threat to the regional states. Indeed, most regional states perceived of India as an important threat. The perception of threat from India is a result of a combination of India’s soft as well as hard power. The third reason for the absence of regional approach is the India-Pakistan dispute. The conflict between the two main powers of the region has made evolution of regional approach nearly impossible. Fourth reason for the absence of regional approach in South Asia is India’s South Asia policy. Despite its rhetoric of multilateralism in global international affairs, India has always followed bilateralism in its relations with South Asian neighbours. India was also anxious not to allow any leverage to outside powers in regional affairs. As a consequence of all these factors, there was no impetus for regionalisation in post-colonial South Asia. The region was not only a late starter, but also a reluctant starter in regionalisation.

*The South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation – SAARC*
The idea of regional co-operation in the South Asian region originated around 1980. Unlike in Hettne’s understanding of the third stage of regionalisation, namely, *regional society*; no trans-border networks – state or non-state – had emerged prior to the formation of the regional organisation in South Asia. In fact, such networks began to emerge only after the formation of the intergovernmental regional organisation, i.e., SAARC.

The first step towards the formation of a regional organisation was a meeting of Foreign Secretaries of the seven South Asian states (viz., Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), held in Colombo in 1981. This was followed by a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the seven states in New Delhi in 1983. This meeting adopted the Declaration on South Asian Regional Co-operation (SARC), and launched the Integrated Programme of Action. Heads of the South Asian states met in Dhaka in December 1985 and signed the Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation. Thus, the SAARC was born. Membership of the SAARC has recently expanded, as Afghanistan joined the organisation as a new member in 2005. Japan and China have been attending SAARC summits as Observers since 2005; South Korea and the US since 2006 and the EU and Iran since 2007. The concept of regional co-operation in South Asia is based on the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other member-states. Moreover, it is expected that regional co-operation would complement and not substitute other forms of bilateral or multilateral co-operation. Also, bilateral and contentious issues are categorically excluded from the deliberations at the SAARC. Aims and objectives of the SAARC include acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and promoting co-operation in these areas; strengthening ‘collective self-reliance’ among countries of the region; co-operating with other developing countries and with organisations having similar aims; and also co-operating with each other at the international forums on matters of common interests.

At the apex of the institutional structure of the SAARC are the Summits. These comprise of the Heads of States/Governments of the member states, and meet generally once in two years. The main policy-making organ is the SAARC Council of Ministers, made of the Foreign Ministers of the member states. They review the progress, explore new areas of co-operation and deliberate on the matters of interests to the regional group. There is a standing committee comprising of Foreign Secretaries of the SAARC states, which also meets twice a year. This committee monitors and co-ordinates the programmes. It also determines modalities of finance, sectoral priorities, and mobilises regional and external resources. In addition there are technical, programme and action committees. SAARC has a permanent Secretariat located at Kathmandu in Nepal, with a Secretary-General as its head and a Director from each state.

Formation of SAARC has led subsequently to the formation of several interstate groups promoting co-operation among regional states in various areas. The Council of Ministers restructured the SAARC IPA during the twelfth Summit. Under the new Regional Integrated Programme of Action (RIPA), there are seven Technical Committees that pursue the integrated plan of action in different areas. The revised RIPA also added a new institution to the SAARC structure, called the Working Groups. These have been especially created to focus on five new and emerging areas, viz., Energy, Tourism, Information & Communication Technology, Intellectual Property Rights and Biotechnology.

Promotion of intra-regional trade was one of the important aims of SAARC. With this intention, the initiative towards forming SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was proposed in December 1991. An Agreement creating the SAPTA was signed on 11 April 1993 during the Seventh
SAARC Summit in Dhaka. SAPTA is a framework of rules providing for step-by-step liberalisation of intra-regional trade. It envisages periodic rounds of trade negotiations for exchange of trade concessions on tariff as well as non-tariff measures. So far, four rounds of trade negotiations have been concluded under SAPTA covering over 5000 commodities. Each Round contributed to an incremental trend in the product coverage and the deepening of tariff concessions over previous Rounds. SAPTA was envisaged primarily as the first step towards the transition to a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). The subsequent aim is the formation of a customs union as well as common market and economic union. In 1995, the Council of Ministers agreed on the need to strive for the realization of SAFTA. The Tenth SAARC Summit in 1998 decided to set up a Committee of Experts (COE) to draft a comprehensive treaty framework for creating a free trade area within the region, taking into consideration the asymmetries in development within the region and bearing in mind the need to fix realistic and achievable targets. The agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), drafted by the COE, was signed on 6 January 2004 during the Twelfth SAARC Summit in Islamabad.13

Under the Trade Liberalisation Programme scheduled for completion by 2016, the customs duties on products from the region will be progressively reduced. However, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are to bring down their customs duties to 0-5 % by 1 January 2009 for the benefit of those member-states, which are designated as the “Least Developed Countries” by the UN. The least developed member states are expected to benefit from additional measures under the special and differential treatment accorded to them under the Agreement. Leaders of the SAARC states agreed in 2002 Summit, to accelerate cooperation in the core areas of trade, finance and investment to realise the goal of an integrated South Asian economy in a step-by-step manner. They also agreed to the vision of a phased and planned process eventually leading to a South Asian Economic Union. The 2004 SAARC Summit entrusted the SAARCFINANCE with the responsibility to study and make recommendations on the early and eventual realization of a South Asian Economic Union (SAEU) as well as to examine the concept of a South Asian Development Bank.

Assessing the SAARC and South Asian Regionalism

Not only has SAARC existed for over 22 years, it has also “widened” as well as “deepened”. Widened, as its membership has increased from seven to eight, and as many as six Observers have been attending its summits. It has deepened as its institutional network and activities have increased. There is also an agreement on trade liberalisation and the formation of a free trade area. However, despite all this, regionalisation process has not taken roots in South Asia. Mere existence of intergovernmental organisations does not indicate advanced stage of regionalism. It implies evolution of regional approach to regional interstate and intrastate conflicts; as well as search for complementarities among regional economies to eventually lead to greater integration.

SAARC as a regional intergovernmental organisation is very unique as far as regional conflicts are concerned. The regional states do not have a common approach to resolving interstate disputes in the region. India emphasises bilateralism and also rejects the role of extra-regional powers in resolving regional disputes. Other regional states, on the other hand, do not reject the role of extra-regional powers. The formation of SAARC has not changed the situation. Indeed, SAARC has categorically avoided any involvement at any level in any interstate – let alone intrastate – conflict in the region. South Asia is a security complex with many pending interstate as well as intrastate conflicts. Yet, SAARC summits or ministerial meetings do not negotiate interstate disputes, either formally or informally. There are no
deliberations on major politico-security issues that affect most regional countries, such as border disputes, ethno-nationalism and separatism, and democratisation. Indeed, most issues of high politics are categorically excluded from the agenda of the SAARC.

Amidst a volatile regional environment SAARC’s efforts at co-operation in the areas of low politics prove weak and superficial. The absence of politico-security confidence-building mechanisms renders economic and socio-cultural and technical confidence-building efforts ineffective. Thus, economic co-operation does not seem to take off and SAFTA does not seem to work. Except the land-locked Nepal and Bhutan, intraregional trade of the other South Asian states is less than 20% of their total world trade.\(^{14}\) In addition, the trade complementarity index of SAFTA on a 0-100 scale is the lowest at 1.3 among existing free trade areas.\(^{15}\)

**REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

**Before ASEAN**

Contemporary Southeast Asia spans most of the littoral and hinterland of the eastern Indian Ocean. However, both geographically and culturally, it can be divided into two distinctly identifiable sub-regions, namely, mainland Southeast Asia and maritime Southeast Asia comprising of. This geographical division also coincides with the cultural division of the region. Indonesia was the first country in the region to become independent from colonial rule. It declared independence from the Dutch in 1945 and finally achieved it in 1949. The Federation of Malaya was formed and became independent in 1957. British Borneo (now the Malaysian provinces of Sarawak and Sabah) and Singapore joined this federation in 1963. Singapore seceded from this federation soon after, in 1965, and became an independent state. For the three states of Indochina, independence came only after bitter and prolonged wars in which both super powers and China were involved, directly or indirectly.

During the 1950s and 1960s, Southeast Asia was divided vertically along the fault line of the Cold War. Thailand and Philippines were clearly in the US camp. Malaysia, before independence, was linked with the West through its Commonwealth alliances. Indochina, on the other hand, was under the influence of the Communist bloc, in particular the Peoples’ Republic of China. This fault line actually defined the evolving regional complex of Southeast Asia of the fifties and the sixties. The commonly perceived threat of Communist expansionism at the broad level, and strong apprehensions about the Chinese intentions in the region at a more specific level, brought the countries of Southeast Asia closer. Thailand and Philippines, together with the US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan, signed the Manila Pact and formed the collective defence treaty of Southeast Asia, viz., SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation). SEATO also covered Malaya, British Borneo and Singapore, until the independence of these territories and through the British membership of the alliance.\(^{16}\) Having adopted non-aligned foreign policy, Indonesia chose to remain outside the Manila Pact.

**The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

The four states of maritime Southeast Asia, along with the only distinctly anti-Communist state of mainland Southeast Asia, viz. Thailand, signed the Bangkok Declaration on 8 August 1967 and formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since then, the regional organisation has expanded to its current membership of ten. Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN on 7 January 1984, just
six days after its independence. The end of the Cold War, however, led to a major expansion in the late 1990s. Vietnam became a member of ASEAN on 28 July 1995; Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997; and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 adopted seven aims and purposes for the organisation. These are: a) economic growth, social progress and cultural development; b) regional peace and stability; c) economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative collaboration; d) mutual assistance in training and research; e) collaboration in agriculture and industry, trade, transportation and communications and the improvement of living standards; f) promotion of Southeast Asian studies; and g) co-operation with regional and international organisations.

Two subsequent treaties form the basis of ASEAN’s quest for regional stability. The first is the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, signed by the heads of governments of the ASEAN member-states on 24 February 1976. It lays down the basic principles for inter-state relations in the region. This Treaty was amended in December 1987 and opened to accession by states outside the region. The second treaty is the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which was signed in December 1995. It commits the ASEAN members not to “develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; or test or use nuclear weapons” in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN has a permanent secretariat which is located in Jakarta, Indonesia. For over four decades after its formation, ASEAN has operated without a formal structure. The ASEAN Summit, which meets at least once a year, is the highest decision-making body of the organisation. The Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN states meet three times a year. These meetings discuss and if needed, adopt common positions on current international and regional issues, particularly those about peace and security. ASEAN has largely relied on informal arrangements, implicit understandings and personal relationships in moving towards its goals of political solidarity, economic integration and co-operation for security. In December 2005, however, the ASEAN leaders decided that it was time to have a formal charter that would “serve as a legal and institutional framework of the ASEAN” and “codify all ASEAN norms, rules and values”. The Charter would give ASEAN a legal personality separate from its member-states, determine the functions and develop the areas of competence of key ASEAN bodies, and their relationship with one another. An Eminent Persons’ Group was appointed with one member from each country, to draw up recommendations for the proposed Charter. The EPG submitted its report to the ASEAN Summit in January 2007 and the Summit endorsed it. Based on this report, a High Level Task Force of senior officials from all member countries prepared the ASEAN Charter. It was adopted in 2007. It has been already ratified by five of the ten of ASEAN members.

Assessing the ASEAN and Southeast Asian Regionalism

ASEAN has played an important role in converting Southeast Asia into a security community. Through the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation as well as the agreement for Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, it developed a regional approach to security and peace. ASEAN has evolved its unique way of avoiding inter-state conflicts, known as the “ASEAN Way”, which relies on consultation consensus. It does not necessarily aim at resolving conflicts. It actually means relying on informal, friendly relations among the leaders of the regional states to avoid aggravation of inter-state conflicts. This way of making decisions ensures that no member-state feels “defeated” by any particular decision. Until now, ASEAN has preferred this approach over institutionalised legal mechanisms of conflict resolution; and
successfully. Some critics, however, claim that this does not really help, as it only pushes the conflicts under the carpet.

As the Cold War came to an end, ASEAN was quick to adapt to the emerging patterns of international relations and change the regional approach to peace and security accordingly. One, it widened to include those very countries in Indochina as its members, against whom it was aimed throughout the Cold War. It also opened its doors to Myanmar, thus, extending its borders to South Asia. Secondly, it sought to engage the big powers, countries that surrounded the region, as well as significant entities like the EU in an extensive dialogue called the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Since its first ministerial meeting was held in 1994, ARF meets regularly alongside the ASEAN ministerial meeting every year. In addition to the ten ASEAN member-states, ARF currently engages fifteen other countries and the EU in a regular constructive and consultative dialogue aimed at regional security. By engaging the countries which compete for influence in the region in a common consultative dialogue, ASEAN attempts to minimize the impact of their competition on the region. This is a significant contribution ARF makes to the regional security.

While there is a lot to talk about the success of the ASEAN in preventing inter-state conflicts among regional states; there are some cases of marked failures too. For example, it was unable to prevent Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor as well as later the atrocities of the Indonesian Army against thousands of East Timorees. ASEAN was not able to do much as a regional organisation to pressurise Indonesia. A more recent example is Myanmar. An ASEAN member since 1997, the human rights record of the ruling junta in Myanmar is among the worst in the world. However, ASEAN as an organisation has failed to take any initiative towards bringing pressure on the country to improve human rights condition within. Even during the latest humanitarian crisis in 2008, ASEAN relied more on extra-regional powers and the UN to pressurise Yangoon to reach the international aid to the affected people.

Yet, the record of security regionalism in Southeast Asia is impressive. The same is not true of economic regionalism, though. This is despite the fact that economic co-operation among member-states was one of the important goals of ASEAN right since its inception. In 1992, the then six members of ASEAN decided to form an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The framework for AFTA is the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) regime. The progress on this front had been impressive and encouraging. ASEAN targets to achieve a zero-tariff internal market by 2015. In the last decade, co-operation also expanded to areas such as services, finance and investment. The ASEAN Surveillance Process designed to monitor exchange rates, macroeconomic aggregates as well as sectoral and social policies. Asian Development Bank (ADB) provides technical support for it. This mechanism was strengthened after the 1997 Financial Crisis. Since then, the ASEAN Finance Ministers meet twice a year to exchange information on economic and financial developments in the region.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The above discussion leads to the conclusion that, while South Asia is stuck at the second stage of regionalism in Hettne’s classification, Southeast Asia has become a regional society already. The network of regional organisations in South Asia has not impacted upon the regional environment. It has not contributed to creating a security community, nor has it contributed to evolving developmental
complementarities. Thus, despite SAARC, South Asia has not been a *regional society* in Hettne’s sense. South Asia continues to remain a peripheral region. As against this, regionalisation of Southeast Asia has been far more successful, both in terms of deepening and widening. Its greatest success is in terms of regional security. Though much is still desired of economic regionalism, the achievements are not less either. It is difficult to be optimistic about the future of regionalisation of South Asia. It is more likely to decline and South Asia as a viable region may get dissolved. However, with its successful adaptation to post-Cold War, post-globalisation international politics, Southeast Asia is emerging as a more coherent region and a force to reckon with.

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3 Hettne, ibid.


5 For a description of the geological and geographical features as well as the definition of the subcontinent, see [http://en.wikipedia.org](http://en.wikipedia.org)

6 Much has been written so far about the India-Pakistan dispute. For recent analyses of relations between the two countries, see P.M. Kamath (ed.) – *India-Pakistan Relations: Courting Peace from the Corridors of War*; (2005: New Delhi; Promilla & Co.); and *Prospects for Peace, Stability and Prosperity in South Asia*; (2005: Islamabad; Institute of Regional Studies)

7 The liberal-internationalist foreign policy of India’s first Prime Minister Nehru broadly emphasised multilateralism in international affairs; yet, followed bilateralism in relations with South Asian neighbours. This was more clearly outlined in the Gujral Doctrine – the guiding principles of India’s South Asia policy as stated by I.K. Gujral, then the Foreign Minister of India. For a detailed discussion, see Sahasrabuddhe, Uttara – “Paradigm Shift in Indian Foreign Policy”; *Indian Journal of Strategic Studies*; October 2003.

8 Gonsalves, Eric & Nancy Jetly – *The Dynamics of South Asia: Regional Co-operation and SAARC*; (1999: New Delhi; Sage)

9 Razia Sultana – “Expansion of SAARC: Implications for South Asia”; *BIISS Journal*; vol. 28, no. 2; 2007; p 142.
10 See the official website of SAARC: http://www.saarc-sec.org

11 The institutional structure is determined by the SAARC Charter. Full text is available on the SAARC website.

12 SAARC: A Profile; (2004: Kathmandu; SAARC Secretariat). This brochure is available also on the SAARC website. For a recent analysis of SAARC, see also, Chaudhury, Ansua Basu Ray – SAARC At Crossroads: The Fate of Regional Co-operation in South Asia; (2006: New Delhi, Samskriti)

13 For the text of the Agreement on South Asia Free Trade Area, see the website of the SAARC.


15 ibid, p 174. The index is 56.3 for NAFTA, 53.4 for EU and 28.6 for Mercosur.

16 Weatherbee, Donald – International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy; (2005: Lanham, MD, US; Rowman & Littlefield); especially chapter 3.

17 Know Your Asean; (2007: Singapore; ISEAS); p 5.

18 For the full text of the Bangkok Declaration, see Handbook of Selected ASEAN Political Documents; (2006: Third edition; Jakarta; ASEAN Secretariat); pp 1-7

19 For full text, see ibid; pp 25-35

20 For full text, see ibid; pp 63-82

21 See the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Political Documents; op. cit.; pp 199-207

22 The text of the ASEAN Charter is available on the website of the ASEAN Secretariat.

23 Weatherbee, op.cit.; p121

24 These countries are: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Timor Leste and the US. See Wulan, Alexandra Retno and Bantarto Bandoro (eds.) – ASEAN’s Quest for a Full-Fledged Community; (2007: Jakarta, CSIS) for an analysis of ARF’s contribution to regional peace.

25 See Chapter 7 by Mari Pangestu in Weatherbee, op. cit. for a detailed analysis; and also Akrasanee Narongchai – “ASEAN in the Past 33 Years: Lessons for Economic Co-operation” in Tay, Simon S.C., Jesus Estanislao & Hadi Soesastro (eds.) – A New ASEAN in a New Millennium; (2000: Jakarta & Singapore; CSIS & SIIA)